Out of the misty beginnings of history certain concepts loom forth into the present. Now they are so finely articulated that their meaning shivers across the boundaries of discrimination. In earlier centuries they may have been accepted as substantially clear and distinct ideas, almost as if the word and the idea remained the same. Back toward the origins, however, they are again softened and obscured into the fog of unknowing. Now, again, we can hardly say the concepts but we can name their names.

One of these is called 'form'. One would think that the discrimination of form was carried out far before the genealogy of Homo Sapiens. Visual form also may have vouchsafed a distinct smell or sound for fish or fossil, but still it was there in recognition. Sometime, at latest by Plato, the actual idea which we can name as form came into play, both as a species of discrimination and as a genus with members. Many of these members came into awareness before the time of the philosophers; such things as curved or straight, boundary or corner must seem to have been recognized, at least in an implicit or functional way, by field marking Egyptians and perhaps earlier with walled cities. However the shapes arose, there were, by classical times, several distinct geometric forms with definite names and approximate models from nature and the works of man. Square, line and circle are some of the most basic of these. The mathematicians of the late third millennium past also wrote of rectangles, points (a subtle concept), ellipses, parabolas, hyperbolae, cones, the regular polyhedra, and subtler curves.

More recently, not only have the subtler curves become still more subtle, but new forms have been brought into recognition: non-Euclidean geometries, fractals, and cuspoids are but the tip of the tip. Would it not seem strange, however, and deeply optimistic, if, at this later date, we found another form less subtle, at least in its simpler instances, more supple than and nearly as primary and simple as square and circle? If so, there is a certain advantage in such primary cognitions, being more clearly specified recognitons, introduced into the realm of discourse and comprehension. When we name something which has never been named before, although instances have been used countlessly in art and design, some new power enters the world, something akin to mind at least, like life, like being. There is another, previously unnamed, form which is as fundamental as those called above. I here name that form as triadic dualism. As with the other species of forms, triadic dualism is also a genus to which species belong which may themselves be either instances of the form or classes of instances of the form.